While critics will point out that this is already underway through translational applications of newly acquired genome-based knowledge, the current search is conducted largely by individual and secretive pharmaceutical companies more interested in generating high-revenue products quickly than in contributing to the overall control of cancer. The extremely high price of most molecularly targeted anti-cancer agents and the emergence of biopharmaceutical companies dedicated to manufacturing unaffordable orphan agents for treating rare diseases, such as the $410,000 per patient per year price tag of Soliris®, are illustrative. Another example is the accelerated drug approval programs (e.g., Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval, and Priority Review) launched by the FDA in response to manufacturers’ pressure that benefit, more drug sponsors’ bottom line, than patients’ health. Some will argue that free competition is the best road to better and cheaper products. Although this is certainly true for consumer products, health care is a supply-driven industry where physicians are arbiters of patient needs, making it impervious to market forces that operate in other industries where consumer demand drives supply and keeps costs in check [746]. Nevertheless, drug manufacturers should not be discouraged from participating in the search for better drugs. Yet, theirs are piecemeal efforts targeting specific diseases that are unsuitable as a cancer control strategy. Such a goal can be achieved only through a focused and centrally coordinated national program that, like the Manhattan project (1939–1946), involved 130,000 people to produce the first atomic bomb that ended WWII, and the Apollo Program that within a decade fulfilled President Kennedy’s vision of “landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to the Earth” when astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin landed their Lunar Module on the moon on July 20, 1969. While the latter prowess was invoked by Mary Lasker and associates as a key argument for spearheading the movement that led to the National Cancer Act of 1971, I envision a joint national effort towards a single goal and a break with the past at all levels of the cancer research “enterprise”. Such an approach was proposed by Benno C. Schmidt Sr., chairmanship of the President’s Cancer Panel, in his 1971 statement before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “However, there is no comprehensive overall program plan today, and such a plan is a sine qua non of effective assault on cancer” [747]. For instance, the practice of awarding research funds to individual researchers to support their pet projects promotes, by design, a fragmented rather than cooperative approach to the War on Cancer. On the one hand, while the motto “one brick at a time” is frequently invoked in cancer research circles to support such an uncoordinated approach, it is more a catchy expression than a means to an end, as the War on Cancer demonstrates. On the other hand, “study section” members at granting agencies who review and recommend individual projects for funding are themselves researchers with expertise in the subjects assigned to them whose decisions are often questionable. This is illustrated by my own experience. Two interrelated applications for research funds were rejected by NCI; one to develop CLL and/or HCL cell lines (“not doable” I was told); the other to study our own anti-cCLLa¹ MoAbs [748] aimed at future human trials (“MoAbs are too dangerous for human use”). These projects, subsequently funded by the Department of Veterans Administration, led to the development of two HCL cell lines [749], their in vitro and in vivo characterization [750], and that of four MoAb-derived immunotoxins [751, 752]. If not biased, my reviewers’ decision revealed a spectacular lack of vision. Indeed, a myriad of MoAbs, in one form or another, are currently part of our armamentarium for treating numerous diseases ranging from rheumatoid arthritis to cancer. To replace this disjointed and multidirectional approach, I propose enrolling tens of thousands of scientists in the medical, biological, biochemical, and other complementary fields of science, concentrated in a few campus-like environments to join forces and focus their interdisciplinary expertise towards a common goal of unraveling the secrets of cancer development and progression and developing tools for their mastery. Participants within each field would bring to the table expertise known or potentially relevant to cancer. Data generated within each field would be analyzed at pre-determined intervals and interpreted in the context of data generated in other fields to serve as a new point of departure for further collaborative study. Such an approach is more likely to uncover common underlying processes that lead to cancer development and progression and the means to block or reverse them than the current fragmented and uncoordinated hit-and-miss approach of developing and screening individual drugs aimed at individual types of cancers; an old technique pioneered by Paul Ehrlich in his 7-year quest for antimicrobials one century ago.